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Politics as a Legal Category 
A Few Considerations on the Limits 




Public Law and Politics 
”The lawyer scholar is still a lawyer. Lawyers are, ought to be, 
and must be, defenders of courts. Courts rely for their institu-
tional legitimacy on their reputations for independence and neu-
trality. If courts are political that fact needs to be hidden by the 
judges themselves and by those who are dependent on courts.” 
Martin SHAPIRO, Alec STONE SWEET1 
 
Public law and political science have a lot in common, since for both disci-
plines politics is a defining phenomenon and an epistemic category of the highest 
relevance2. What separates starkly the two fields of knowledge is the diametrically 
opposed position which they adopt towards this common point of reference. 
Whereas political scientists would embrace politics, since they ”do not have the 
duty to defend courts that lawyers have, and they do have an inclination to cele-
brate rather than disguise politics when they see it, in court as well as elsewhere”3, 
public lawyers in the academia (save perhaps for the various ”legal realist” 
schools), contrariwise, seek to the utmost to drive a wedge between politics and 
public law proper4. 
The academic preoccupation with the law-politics distinction mirrors a prac-
tical necessity in public law adjudication. Public law is characterized as ”political 
law”, a qualification often used with the lack of reflexivity usually entailed by 
commonplaces. By the same token, one also accepts as self-evident the notion that 
adjudication should not be, in a rule of law state, political. Indeed, about the 
worst label that can be attached to a constitutional or supreme court decision is to 
call it ”politicized”5. 
                                                    
1 On Law, Politics, and Judicialization, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. 
2 Comparing these two divergent standpoints in relation to politics is a good introduction to 
this discussion, given that, as it has been rightly pointed out, both the relationship between 
academic disciplines (law and political science) and the relationship between legal and political 
theories are methodologically sound ways of approaching the relationship between law and 
politics as such. See Adam TOMKINS, ”In Defence of the Political Constitution”, Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, vol. 22, no. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 157-175.  
3 Martin SHAPIRO, Alec STONE SWEET, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization, op. cit., p. 6.  
4 By ”political” decision, I understand any decision that cannot, by its nature, be arrived at in 
a judicial proceeding, by a judicial manner, i.e., rational determination.  
5 Anecdotically, in the course of my career thus far, I have encountered many European or 
North American public law professors who, when they wanted to cast unalloyed contempt on an 
argument, invariably deemed it “politicized” or ”ideologized”. 
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The two issues are in an antinomical relation only apparently. Public law de-
serves its legal status to the extent that the judiciary is politically independent and 
neutral. Judicial independence and neutrality, beautifully captured by Montes-
quieu`s aphorism about ”the power of judging…[which] amounts to nothing”1 or 
by the famous Hamiltonian reference to ”the least dangerous branch”, showcase in 
equal measure the Janus-faced character of the judiciary as a branch of govern-
ment: political weakness or vulnerability on the one hand and – on the other – the 
strength deriving from its legitimacy as a ”forum of principle”2. 
In institutional terms, judicial independence is safeguarded by a number of 
well-known constitutional or organic law-level guarantees with respect to appoint-
ments, security of tenures of office, prohibitions against diminishment of revenue, 
various forms of protecting judges from at-will political removal. These technical 
matters fall outside the argumentative scope and obvious space limitations of the 
present study. Suffice it to point out that in England, whose history is usually 
taken to unfold the paradigmatic story of constitutionalism, one of the main 
pre-revolutionary points of contention between the Stuarts and the parliamentary 
party was the independence of the judiciary. First recognized during Charles I, 
who conceded in 1642, however reluctantly, to respect the appointment of judges 
”during good behavior” (quamdiu se bene gesserint), the principle gained constitu-
tional preeminence when, during the Glorious Revolution, William and Mary ac-
cepted judicial independence as a condition for their accession to the throne. In the 
Heads of Grievances, the issue is itemized as 
”making judges’ commissions quamdiu se bene gesserint, and for ascertaining 
and establishing their salaries, to be paid out of the public revenue only; and 
for preventing their being removed and suspended from the execution of 
their offices, unless by due course of law”. 
These practices were finally raised to statutory-constitutional status, being en-
acted in the 1701 Act of Settlement3. 
To restate the point, while public law is ”political law” (especially if related 
and contrasted to its traditional counterpart, private law), the ”political” qualifica-
tion does not undermine its legal status insofar as constitutional and administra-
tive adjudication as well as the body of scholarship which conceptualizes and 
evaluates the theoretical consistency and justification of these practices succeed in 
demarcating what is properly legal from the domain of politics proper4. This dis-
junction is, of course, by no means an easy one to draw. 
                                                    
1 ”Des trois puissances dont nous avons parlé, celle de juger est en quelque façon nulle.” 
2 Ronald M. DWORKIN, ”The Forum of Principle- Constitutional Adjudication and Demo-
cratic Theory”, New York University Law Review, vol. 56, 1977, pp. 469-518.  
3 12& 13 W. II, c. 2 (1701). See, on these issues, Rudolph GNEIST, The History of the English 
Constitution, Ph.A. Ashworth transl., G.P. Putnam`s Sons, New York, 1886 and F.W.  MAITLAND, 
The Constitutional History of England, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1963.  
4 While I am not unmindful of the way in which a Constitution and ”constitutional mo-
ments” structure the preconditions of politics, here I assume a constitutional order already 
”constituted”, where the constitutional politics/constitutional law distinction has already been 
transcended. See, for good treatments of the interrelation law/politics on this more foundational 
level, Bruce ACKERMAN, ”Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law,” Yale Law Journal, vol. 99, 
no. 3, December 1989, pp. 453-549 and Martin LOUGHLIN, ”Constitutional Theory: A 25th 
Anniversary Essay”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 25, no. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 183-202. Also 
see, related, Dieter GRIMM, ”Integration by Constitution”, International Journal of Constitutional 
Law, vol. 3, nos. 2&3, May 2005, pp. 193-208.  
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Constitutional and administrative courts have themselves evolved, across ju-
risdictions, a number of fairly common techniques which permit the prima facie 
avoidance of head-on collisions with politics. Among them, one can point out as a 
representative example the vast body of ”justiciability” adjudication doctrines that 
the Supreme Court of the United States has developed around the ”Case or Con-
troversy” requirement of Art. III in the Constitution (understood to bar the solu-
tion of constitutional and administrative issues which do not arise out of a concrete 
and actual controversy between litigants): standing, mootness, ripeness, the refusal 
to answer ”political questions” or to deliver advisory opinions to the other 
branches of government. Equally relevant, although in a less direct way, is the re-
fusal or reluctance of constitutional courts to apply constitutional guarantees to 
government agents acting extraterritorially1. While this problem is more apparent 
as expounded by the American developments, where the Constitution has been 
from the onset, after the early landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison2 ”welded 
judicial review to the political axiom of limited government”3, regarded as a law 
whose interpretation falls, just as it is the case with any other law, on the Judiciary 
Department, it is yet by no means idiosyncratic. The identification and consequent 
avoidance of politics in constitutional and administrative adjudication is a concern 
which cuts across constitutional systems and can be encountered, as a matter of 
kind though perhaps not of degree, in Continental jurisdictions as well. To wit, 
commenting on the fact that the German Constitutional Court did not expound, 
                                                    
1 See for instance In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), holding that jury trial protections do not 
apply to a prisoner of war tried by a military tribunal outside the United States, Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), similar, and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 494 U.S. 259 (1990), 
holding that the Fourth Amendment guarantees against ”unreasonable searches and seizures” do 
not apply to a Mexican drug lord whose house had been searched in Mexico by DEA agents acting 
in cooperation with Mexican federal police, without a U.S. court warrant. It is unclear to what 
extent the holdings of these extraterritoriality decisions have been put in question by the recent 
Guantánamo-related decisions in Rasul v. Bush and Al-Odah v. United States 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
The peculiarity of the Guantánamo situation does not, nonetheless, warrant any simple answer. 
Probably the most relevant example in the field of administrative law proper is the so-called ”entry 
fiction” doctrine, according to which being physically on American soil is considered legally 
fictitious before one has passed through immigration control. Equally relevant, even though not 
from a judicial practice benchmark, is the Australian federal Parliament`s decision to declare 
certain coastal areas as part of Australia only in terms of international law and not in what 
concerns the application of domestic legislation, in order to stave off illegal immigration (namely, 
to avoid lengthy judicial postponement of deportation proceedings). Problematic as these 
developments may be, they go to shed light at the multifarious problems at hand.  
2 5 U.S. 137 (Cranch) (1803). The understanding that the Constitution would need to be a 
judicially enforceable charter arguably predates the decision; an argument much akin to Justice 
Marshall`s in Marbury can be found in Alexander HAMILTON, The Federalist, no. 78, in The 
Federalist Papers, edited and with an introduction by Clinton Rossiter, Penguin Books-Mentor, 
1961. For a good exposition of the American ”constitutional exceptionalism” and an insightful 
comparison of American and early European constitutionalism, see Martin A. ROGOFF, “A 
Comparison of Constitutionalism in France and the United States”, Maine Law Review, vol. 49, 
1997, pp. 21-84/ pp. 31-32: ”In America the idea of constitutionalism is intimately attached to, and 
in fact inseparable from, the actual written constitution of the country. Constitutionalism is not a 
vague concept calling for the separation and limitation of public power, the rights of the 
governed, and adherence to certain time-honored procedures, customs, and values. It has rather 
an immediacy and a tangibility, and an association with a particular document, which is usually 
lacking even in other constitutional democracies”. 
3 Henry P. MONAGHAN, ”Marbury and the Administrative State”, Columbia Law Review, 
vol. 83, January 1983, pp. 1-34/p. 32. 
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unlike its American counterpart, a ”political-question doctrine”, the comparative 
constitutional law scholar David P. Currie observed that, nonetheless, this formal 
omission is ”a matter more of semantics than of substance”, since 
”[i]t is entirely consistent with a judicial duty to say what the law is to con-
clude that the law commits a particular issue to the discretion or determi-
nation of another branch of government. The German court has done so a 
number of times, and it is not clear that our political question doctrine means 
anything more”1 [emphasis supplied]. 
Discretion is indeed the key word. Politics in legal terms is defined or concep-
tualized as discretion. Conversely, the existence of places uncontrolled by law, i.e., 
by a judicial (re)determination of the decisional outcome – and thus controlled by 
politics – translates into the extent to which a place for discretion is recognized in 
adjudication. From a judicial perspective, discretion means lack of a precise legal 
rule or principle to control the resolution of a certain situation brought before a 
court and the consequent recognition by the judge that the solution of a given 
matter in contention must of necessity be left to judgment by the political 
branches of government, through the characteristically political means: voting or 
executive/administrative discretionary decision. 
From an adjudication-oriented perspective, the judges’ refusal to interfere 
with politics by recognizing political discretion embraces two main forms, (1) judi-
cial deference to policy-making or administrative discretion and (2) a deferential 
judicial attitude towards Politics proper (or, to use Carl Schmitt`s established jar-
gon, ”the political”), as best instantiated in an exercise of sovereignty by the Execu-
tive, in the field of Locke’s ”federative power”. The two areas of political discre-
tion, ”small p and large P politics”2 if one will, are distinct as a matter of kind and 
not degree. They so appear both as a matter of practices and in terms of conceptual 
justification. The latter dimension of the necessity for a law-politics disjunction is 
well suggested by Carl Schmitt’s characteristically cryptic observations that the ex-
ception has ”juristic significance” and that ”[t]he assertion that the exception is 
truly appropriate for the juristic definition of sovereignty has a systematic, le-
gal-logical foundation”3. 
This is not to deny the fact that, in the abstract, an assertion of discretion imme-
diately creates an unavoidable dilemma. The ”horns” of the dilemma are well cap-
tured by a passage from Justice Coke’s 1598 decision for the Court of Common 
Pleas in the Rooke’s Case. The case dealt with an action by one Rooke against the 
Commissioners of Sewers, which had assessed his property (a long stretch of land 
adjacent to the banks of the river Thames) disproportionately, even though owners 
of inland properties also profited from the public works that had secured the 
banks against flooding. Rooke sued, the Commissioners argued that their govern-
ing statute gave them unfettered discretion with regard to assessment of property, 
and Coke decided for the plaintiff, reasoning, in pertinent part, as follows: 
                                                    
1 David P. CURRIE, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chicago University 
Press, Chicago, 1994, pp. 170-171.  
2 See David DYZENHAUS, ”The Left and the Question of Law”, Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence, vol. 17, January 2004, pp. 7-30, for an explanation and critique of the matter.  
3 Carl SCHMITT, Political Theology-Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, G. Schwab 
transl., The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, c1985, pp. 5-6.  
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”And notwithstanding the said words of the said Commission give au-
thority to the Commissioners to do according to their discretions, yet their pro-
ceedings ought to be limited and bound with the rule of reason and Law. For 
discretion is a science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, 
between right and wrong, and between shadows and substance, between eq-
uity and colorable glosses and pretenses, and not to doe according to their wills and 
private affections; for as one saith, Talis discretio discretionem confundit”1. 
Not to let oneself ensnared by this great lawyer’s captivating style, one 
should notice that the true problem occurs only when a judge does not have a 
principled, rational background against which to review the discretion of the ex-
ecutive/administration, so that the decision becomes in turn the reflection of his 
own ”will and private affection”, a simple change of venue for the exercise of dis-
cretion, without the accountability ensured by the contemporary check on the po-
litical branches, i.e. voting. 
At the closing of this section, it should be restated that this paper is not an at-
tempt to compare and contrast how different constitutional systems insulate the ju-
diciary from politics by means of institutional design arrangements safeguarding 
judicial independence (e.g., provisions in the Constitution and organic legislation 
establishing a body such as the Romanian Superior Council of Magistrates). Nor is 
it an elaboration on the methods used by judges across jurisdictions, when decid-
ing public law cases, in order to limit, insofar as possible, judicial inroads into the 
field of politics proper, and thus to ensure judicial neutrality (e.g., self-imposed 
rules to limit the access to the court of ”ideological” claimants with a purely ”ab-
stract” interest in a given matter, such as the ones arrived at by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in ”standing” cases). My current quest is at the same time more limited in its 
scope and more foundational in terms of its object. Such technicalities as those 
mentioned above presuppose the existence of systemic conceptual distinctions be-
tween the domain of politics and the field of law. My present study is an incipient 
inquiry into these underlying law/politics delineations. 
Classical Distinctions 
”Le gouvernement en dehors de sa sphère ne doit avoir 
aucun pouvoir; dans sa sphère il ne saurait en avoir trop.” 
Benjamin CONSTANT2 
 
”The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which 
obliges every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches… 
that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm 
another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.” 
John LOCKE3 
 
Classical constitutionalist theory and practice coagulated, in terms of both con-
ceptual justification and corresponding practices, around a number of coherent 
bright-line foundational distinctions. These constitutive differentiations between 
                                                    
1 C.J. COKE, Rooke`s Case 5 Co. Rep. 99b (1598) [first emphasis supplied].  
2 Écrits et discours politiques.  
3 The Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690).  
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legally controlled domains and areas of state action governed by political decision 
rendered the separation between law and politics easier to both conceptualize and 
maintain in public law adjudication. 
In passing, accepting that every legal and political theory is underpinned by a 
certain anthropological profession of faith, one could remark that these concep-
tual and practical law/politics differentiations correspond to a moderate prag-
matic-skeptical conception about human nature. This moderate foundational skep-
ticism is well exemplified by the Alexander Hamilton`s observation that: ”The sup-
position of universal venality in human nature is little less an error in political rea-
soning than the supposition of universal rectitude”1. In the same vein, James Madi-
son wrote that while ”[t]here is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a 
certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human 
nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence”2. 
In this vein, it must be emphasized that judicial decision-making is one of 
the most rationalized forms of social action3. By contrast, a political decision, be-
ing a choice determined by considerations of contextual opportunity or resulting 
from the sheer aggregation of a number of votes, is not charged in the same man-
ner and to the same extent by requirements of rationality. Admitting, therefore, 
that there are limits intrinsic to adjudication embraces a tragic form. The confron-
tation with our constitutive limits (and their acceptance) always partakes of the 
nature of tragedy4. 
The classical distinctions mentioned above are very well showcased, as a mat-
ter of conceptual justification, by John Locke’s theory of separation of powers. His 
Second Treatise is a good heuristic choice not only because unfolding the logic of his 
distinctions between various forms of state action allows us to go to the roots of the 
matter without having to review and compare historical-legal evolutions across ju-
risdictions; such comparison would, needless to say, easily turn this article into a 
monograph. More importantly, Locke is in many ways the theoretical father of 
modern constitutionalism also because his version of the separation of powers doc-
trine is of a normative, rather than constitutive or procedural nature5, and presents 
itself almost in an adjudicatory form. 
                                                    
1 Alexander HAMILTON, The Federalist, no. 76, in The Federalist Papers, cit.  
2 James MADISON, The Federalist, no. 55, in The Federalist Papers, cit. At the antipode of 
this moderately skeptical conception about human nature is the cast of mind described by 
Michael Oakeshott as ”rationalism in politics”. See Michael OAKESHOTT, Rationalism in 
Politics and Other Essays, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1991 (c1962). An equally scathing and 
intuitive criticism (and perhaps an even more pleasurable read) can be found in Dostoyevsky`s 
The Possessed.  
3 ”Adjudication is, then, a device which gives formal and institutional expression to the 
influence of reasoned argument in human affairs. As such it assumes a burden of rationality not 
borne by any other form of social ordering. A decision which is the product of reasoned argument must 
be prepared itself to meet the test of reason. This higher responsibility toward rationality is at once the 
strength and the weakness of adjudication as a form of social ordering”. Lon FULLER, ”The Forms 
and Limits of Adjudication”, Harvard Law Review, vol. 92, December 1978, pp. 353-409.  
4 See Gabriel LIICEANU, Tragicul: O fenomenologie a limitei şi depăşirii, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 
2005, and Despre limită, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2005.  
5 The ”constitutive” or ”procedural” versions of the separation of powers doctrine are of 
a more dynamic nature and revolve around the idea of balance, whether a balance of classes 
(the ”mixed government” theories) or the less historically contingent, more modern version, of 
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In this way, his theory anticipates by more than a century the modern logic of 
a written Constitution as the enforceable legal barrier between the government and 
the individual. The fact that Locke is not interested in the very concrete, pragmatic 
concern raised by power unchecked by counterpoising power, finds also its justifi-
cation, perhaps, in the finality with which the Civil War had already settled the 
struggles over sovereignty between the Crown and the Parliament. What had been 
a crucial matter for Hobbes in 1651, when the stakes were sharply visible and the 
possibility of ultimate divisive conflict was still acutely present, had become by 
and large a moot issue by 1688. The Glorious Revolution would be an unproblem-
atic re-assertion of an already given answer. 
Be the reason what it may, it should be re-emphasized that, for Locke, writing 
on the assumptions of limited government and public authority as a trust, the limi-
tations on the exercise of state power are normative rather than constitutive and 
present themselves in a judicial template. For Locke, the key concern is always ar-
bitrariness or discretion and not tyranny or despotism1 or rather, tyranny as a con-
crete problem related to the actual possibility of aggrandizement of a ruler or an 
institution to unlimited power becomes arbitrariness as a justice-related concern of 
the discrete individual2. This template is best shorthanded by the Lockean state-
ment that ”where law ends, there tyranny begins”. Namely, since the state appears 
in his rendition as a sum of limited competences, for Locke the question is always: 
”Who will be the judge?” in case of trespass or misuse of public power. Given the 
centrality of this question, the different answers with which it is met are all the 
more important. In this respect, the analytical distinction of state functions is of the 
utmost importance for the present project and pause must be taken at this juncture 
for a more searching inquiry. 
                                                    
”checks-and-balances” which prevent tyranny by the interplay of institutionally designed blocks 
and counterpoises. ”Mixed government” theories are usually exemplified through the description 
given by the Greek historian Polybius to the Republican Roman Constitution, whereas the modern 
version of balance theories is usually attributed to Montesquieu’s 1748 Spirit of Laws. See, for 
instance, Kurt von FRITZ, The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity: A Critical Analysis of 
Polybius’ Political Ideas, Columbia University Press, New York, 1954 and Michael MENDLE, 
Dangerous Positions-Mixed Government, the Estates of the Realm, and the Answer to the xix propositions, 
University of Alabama Press, Alabama, 1985. A history of the separation of powers doctrines, with 
taxonomies and thorough distinctions is provided in the classical English language studies, M.J.C. 
VILE, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967 and W.G. 
GWYN, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers, Tulane University Press, New Orleans, 1965. The 
latter work focuses more specifically on English developments and draws more clearly the 
distinction between the balance and normative/rule of law separation of powers theories.  
1 ”Absolute Arbitrary Power” is defined as the ”Governing without settled standing Laws”. 
John LOCKE, Second Treatise of Civil Government, Hackett Publishing, 1980 (1690), Indianapolis, 
C.B. Macpherson, ed., Sec. 137.  
2 That is to say, unless tyranny would be perceived as discretion writ large. This sort of 
perception is, nonetheless, not in line with either the constitutionalist theories under review here or 
with specific constitutionalist developments, but rather corresponds to a specific kind of dogmatic 
and abstract normativism. The latter, in Jürgen Habermas’s apt characterization, is associated with 
”[t]he bourgeois idea of the law-based state, namely, the binding of all state activity to a system of 
norms legitimated by public opinion (a system that had no gaps, if possible), already aimed at 
abolishing the state as a system of domination altogether. Acts of sovereignty were considered 
apocryphal per se”. In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991, p. 82. 
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Locke distinguishes four ”powers”1. The ”legislative” is the power to prescribe 
”settled standing laws…stated rules of right and property”2. These material (or 
substantive) limitations on legislation are crucial since, while Locke’s legislature is 
the ”supreme power of the commonwealth…sacred and unalterable in the hands 
where the community have once placed it”3, its supremacy is bound by the norma-
tive limitations placed on it, ”the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for 
certain ends”4. A law simply loses its character once enacted in particularized form 
or outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislature. The distinction between 
”established, promulgated, standing laws”, regarding property and liberty and 
”arbitrary, extemporary dictates and resolutions” is crucial and ubiquitously 
re-stated throughout the entire work. 
The executive power is the mere subsumption of general rules to particular 
cases, a ”ministerial and subordinate power”5 [emphasis supplied]. True, a distinc-
tion between function and organ or branch of power is provided. In ”moderate 
monarchies” it is necessary that ”the legislative power and executive power are in 
distinct hands”6. Yet, this apportionment of functions among distinct branches or 
organs is not predicated primarily upon the necessity of fragmenting power but 
rather proceeds on the assumption that legislation, given the limited trust that is 
the government, logically constitutes an exceptional activity and therefore, when the 
legislature is not in session, there is a need for a ”power always in being”. Put sim-
ply, there is no need for continuous law-making yet the laws, once made, need as a 
matter of course to be always enforced7. The executive is categorized as ”ministe-
rial” in nature since, once legislation is premised as normative in nature and 
non-discretionary (addresses the individual, in a general form, limited to a clearly 
delineated subject-matter legislative jurisdiction), its application is unproblematic, 
constituting almost a practical syllogism, in which the major premise is the legisla-
tive rule, the factual background constituting the minor premise, whereas the con-
clusion follows logically as an application of law to facts. 
The further functional breakdown is, conceptually, also indebted to and re-
volves around the generality-impartiality version of the rule of law which pervades 
and dominates the logic of his entire work. The federative and prerogative ”powers” 
                                                    
1Raymond Carré de Malberg considered the term ”power” somewhat misleading in this 
context: ”Au fond, la doctrine de Locke se ramène donc à une simple théorie de distinction des fonctions: 
sous la réserve que le roi ne peut à lui seul faire la loi et est souvent soumis à cette dernière, ce n’est 
pas encore une doctrine de franche separation des pouvoirs” [emphasis supplied]. Raymond CARRÉ 
DE MALBERG, Contributions à la Théorie générale de l`État, tome deuxième, Sirey, Paris, 1922, p. 3. Also 
see Ernest BARKER’s ”Introduction” to Otto von GIERKE, Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500 
to 1800, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934, p. xci: 
”[Locke] simply seeks to distinguish, in thought, between the different functions of political authority. 
He is dealing with the logical analysis of functions, rather than with the practical question of 
separation (or union) of the organs which exercise those functions”. In Gierke`s view, Locke offers an 
essentially ”normative view of separation of powers” [emphasis added].  
2 Sec. 137.  
3 Sec. 137. 
4 M.J.C. VILE, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967, 
p. 63, discussing Locke’s theory of separation of powers: ”The legislative authority is the authority 
to act in a particular way”. 
5 Sec. 152. 
6 Sec. 159.  
7 Sec. 153: ”It is not necessary, no, nor so much as convenient, that the legislative should be 
always in being; but absolutely necessary that the executive power should, because there is not 
always need of new laws to be made, but always need of execution of the laws that are made”.  
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are the result of Locke’s insightful observation that the exercise of political power 
will inevitably bear on issues which, by their very nature, cannot be predetermined by 
rules, once the content, purpose, and scope of legislation has been delineated. Since 
the body politic as a whole is still in the state of nature in its relation to other com-
monwealths, what foreigners do cannot be accurately predicted or effectively regu-
lated and thus ”their actions and the variations of designs and interests” cannot be 
normatively encompassed by a rule of conduct1. Therefore, the federative power is 
functionally distinguished from performance of ministerial or administrative tasks: 
”This therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alli-
ances, and all the transactions, with all persons and communities without the 
common-wealth, and may be called federative, if any one pleases. So be the 
thing understood, I am indifferent as to the name”2. 
The power of prerogative is also analytically and functionally dependent on the 
notion of legislation, qualitatively defined, since prerogative is nothing more than 
”[the] power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescrip-
tion of the law, and sometimes even against it”3. Locke`s definition of the ”preroga-
tive” is an amalgam of (1) a historical dimension, derived from the permeation of the 
normative argument with English historical contingencies deriving from the attrib-
utes of the contemporaneous English royal prerogative4; (2) the related justification 
of emergency powers (dispatch in the actions of government is needed when the leg-
islative is not in session or the executive must act in respect to ”things […] which the 
law can by no means provide for”); (3) a restatement-equivalent of the Aristotelian 
notion of equity (epíeikeia), according to which the inflexibility and occasional sever-
ity of rules must be mitigated and particularized for considerations of justice in indi-
vidual cases, since a rule, precisely as a consequence of its generality and impartial-
ity, cannot foresee all future occurrences and thus exceptions and derogations or ad-
                                                    
1 As a matter of political and legal theory, this distinction is usually explained in natural law 
(the contractarian tradition; the argument comes forth most clearly, though with different 
emphasis, in both Locke and Hobbes) by the fact that, while the creation of civil government 
presupposes the giving up of each member’s natural right to wage war within the political 
community (consequently, all-out conflict is contained within), without, states as such remain in 
the state of nature (which is potentially a state of war). Blackstone seized on this principle, and 
adduced it to strengthen the argument, in addition to historical (the Crown’s residuum of power) 
and prudential (need for unity and strength) considerations: ”For it is held by all the writers on 
the law of nature, that the right of making war, which by nature subsisted in every individual, is 
given up by all private persons that enter into society, and is vested in the sovereign power”. 
William BLACKSTONE’s Commentaries on the Laws of England. Facsimile of the First Edition, 
vol. 1, Chicago University Press, Chicago & London, 1979, p. 249. 
2 Sec. 146. For our purposes, the following citation from Sec. 147 is of particular interest: 
”And though this federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the 
common-wealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws, 
than the executive; and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those, whose 
hands it is in, to be managed for the public good: for the laws that concern subjects one amongst 
another, being to direct their actions, may well enough precede them. But what is to be done in 
reference to foreigners, depending much upon their actions, and the variations of designs and 
interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of those, who have this power committed to 
them, to be managed by the best of their skill, for the advantage of the commonwealth”.  
3 See Chapter XIV, ”Of Prerogative”. 
4 For instance, the convening and dissolution of Parliament was historically an important 
part of royal prerogative. The authoritative commentary on the mater is William BLACKSTONE, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, cit., Ch. 7, ”Of the King’s Prerogative”. 
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ditions must be made to the law, in favor of the law itself1; (4) the equivalent of the 
modern notion of ”policy-making discretion”. 
Hence, in the case of the legislative power and its ministerial ”execution”, both 
the trespass of the legislator and that of the executive/administrator can be evalu-
ated more easily and along a coherent and principled baseline of assessment (gen-
eral rules of life, liberty, and property). By the same token, in the case of the latter 
two powers, the federative and the prerogative, since their exercise is contingent 
on unforeseen events which cannot be predetermined by a legislative rule, the only 
evaluation on their exercise can be one political in nature. True enough, Locke in-
sists relentlessly that, even though a rule cannot, by necessity, be arrived at to con-
trol the discretion inherent in the exercise of the prerogative and the federative 
powers, this inevitably ensuing leeway cannot mean that these kinds of attribu-
tions are to be exercised arbitrarily, since discretion is only warranted by public 
purpose: it is to be exercised ”for the public good”. Yet, as one can see, what is in 
the public good, unless a clear principle guides and constrains the evaluation itself, 
is in no way self-evident or open to rational determination2. 
Actual practices paralleled these distinctions between legal and discretionary. 
For instance, classical legal adjudication and doctrine, both on the Continent and to 
an even greater measure in the Anglo-Saxon world, posited the attitude of a judge 
on a distinction between state encroachment or invasion of the protected sphere of 
life, property, and liberty (where liberty included freedom of contract) and state 
provision of benefits (right/privilege distinction). Likewise, the classical frame-
work made the difference between domestic administration of the law (legal) and 
political exercises of state power (by their nature discretionary). The more some-
thing would be either in the nature of a privilege or political in nature, the more the 
decision would automatically be classified as discretionary and the Executive/ad-
ministration would be allowed to control the decisional outcome with minimal judi-
cial interference with the administrative determination, in respect of (1) the inter-
pretation of the governing legal provisions, (2) the factual consistency or correctness 
of the result and (3) the procedure followed in arriving at a given decision (due 
process or ”natural justice” guarantees). It is exemplary in this respect to note, in 
passing, that the term as such of ”administrative law” was producing a certain de-
gree of unease or perplexity in Anglo-Saxon lawyers, so much so that, as late as the 
early 1900’s, the great English constitutionalist Albert Venn Dicey could claim that 
England and countries deriving their civilization from it knew no such thing: 
                                                    
1 The fact that positive laws can never encompass ex ante the variety of circumstances in its 
application – and the corresponding human strife to anticipate this problem – was first noted by 
Plato, in the Statesman (294): ”The differences of men and actions, and the endless irregular 
movements of human things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule…But the law is 
always striving to make one….”  
2 To wit, Carl Schmitt, perhaps the most acute critic of liberalism, observed with charac-
teristic acumen this tension or rather ambivalence in Locke`s argument, namely that the latter 
treats the notion ”public good” as if it attained a non-problematic and self-evident, objective 
meaning: ”La théorie de l’État issue de la réaction nobiliaire a refusé de prendre en considération 
l’existence d’un intérêt pour la décision comme telle, et a vu dans le ’peuple’ l’instance à 
l`intérieur de laquelle aucun doute ne peut surgir sur ce qui est juste et dans l`intérêt public. Elle 
croit que, sur ce point, il existe une conviction générale, identique et immédiate, de tous le 
citoyens. Cela est particulièrement clair dans la conception anglaise”. Carl SCHMITT, La 
Dictature, transl. M. Köller & D. Séglard, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2000, pp. 40-41 (commenting on 
Sec. 240 in the Second Treatise).  
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”The absence from our language of any satisfactory equivalent for the 
expression droit administratif is significant; the want of a name arises at bot-
tom from our non-recognition of the thing itself. In England and in countries 
which, like the United States, derive their civilization from English sources, 
the system of administrative law and the very principles on which it rests 
are in truth unknown”1. 
A paradigmatic example of the judicial treatment of policy-making discretion 
is offered by a Massachusetts case from the turn of the nineteenth century, 
McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, in which a policeman fired by the local mayor on 
account for soliciting funds for political purposes in defiance of the city police 
regulations, challenged the decision both in terms of substance (arguing that he 
was exercising his constitutionally protected right to free speech) and procedure 
(arguing that he was owed more than his interviews with the mayor, i.e., specifica-
tions of the charges against him, opportunity to rebut them, advance notice of the 
decision to fire him, reasons stated). In a characteristically terse and eloquent opin-
ion for the Court, Oliver Wendell Holmes did away, without much ceremony, with 
both the substantive and the procedural claims: 
”The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he 
has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for 
hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights 
of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The 
servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are 
offered him. On the same principle the city may impose any reasonable con-
dition upon holding offices within its control. This condition seems to us rea-
sonable, if that be a question open to revision here”2. 
As one can readily see, the categorization of a given claim in terms of privilege 
(a government license, a public job, any kind of government largesse) immediately 
determined the level and standard of review with respect to the substance of the 
decision. In terms of procedure, the conclusion follows logically from there since, 
as Bentham put it, procedure is mere ”adjective law”, dependent on the deter-
mined noun: the more important the right or interest claimed, the more procedural 
safeguards will attach to it. The converse is also true, since the level of procedurali-
zation will inevitably affect the outcome of a decision. 
The Politics/law distinction is well presented by the administrative law prac-
tice evolved by the French Conseil d’État around the doctrine of ”acts of govern-
ment” (actes de gouvernement), according to which administrative action with a ”po-
litical object” (mobile politique) would be automatically classified as unreviewable. 
Equally relevant is the reluctance or refusal of courts to interfere with administra-
tive actions in the field of immigration. In this respect, it should be pointed out that 
this domain of state action as such is particularly worthy of attention, to the extent 
that immigration practices within a given jurisdiction are often dealing with ”micro-
cosmic manifestations of the greater conflict or potential for conflict without and so 
eminently fit for disposal by unfettered executive discretion”3. Thus, for instance, in 
                                                    
1 A.V. DICEY, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, Liberty Fund, India-
napolis, 1982 (1915), p. 215. 
2 McAuliffe v. Mayor of City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-518 (1892).  
3 David DYZENHAUS, ”The Left and the Question of Law”, cit., p. 10. I am quoting this 
passage from David Dyzenhaus’s work because and to the extent that the argument as such is 
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the American case Mahler v. Eby, the United States Supreme Court found constitu-
tional a formula to deport aliens based on administrative determination of ”unde-
sirability”, against a challenge of unconstitutionality based on non-delegation: 
“Nor is the act invalid as delegating legislative power to the Secretary of 
Labor. The sovereign power to expel aliens is political, and is vested in the 
political branches of government”1. 
Contemporary Law/Politics Dilemmas. 
Adjudication as Policy-Making  
and Adjudication as Moral Melodrama 
 
”Nothing is stable. Nothing absolute. 
All is fluid and changeable. 
There is an endless ’becoming’.” 
Benjamin CARDOZO2 
 
”With the ascendancy of law as right we do not 
therefore reach the end of history, or an escape 
from politics. Instead, this legalization of poli-
tics has led primarily to a politicization of law.” 
Martin LOUGHLIN3 
 
As the constitutive distinctions of classic constitutionalism blurred, adjudication 
became politicized to the same extent that politics became legalized or ”judicialized”. 
The distinction between administrative policy-making discretion and adjudi-
cation which corresponded to the classical difference between right and privilege 
could not survive the modern administrative-welfare state (Sozialstaat, État-provi-
dence). This delineation had been essentially fused at the hip with a concept of leg-
islation which would become rapidly untenable. Namely, the law can be character-
ized as a rule of law if legislation is in fact limited to the regulation of questions of 
right as between individuals (torts, property, contracts) or claims of wrong by the 
state against an individual (criminal law)4. The limitation of legislation and thus of 
                                                    
very well problematized and presented in his rendition. My general position on the matters 
discussed here is opposed to that argued by Professor Dyzenhaus.  
1 Mahler v. Eby 264 U.S. 32, 40 (1924) (opinion of the Court, per Taft, C.J.). Also see Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (sovereign [inherent] power to exclude upheld); Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (sovereign power to deport upheld).  
2 The Nature of the Judicial Process, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1921. 
3 Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship between Law and Politics, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2000.  
4 Richard B. STEWART, Cass SUNSTEIN, ”Public Programs and Private Rights”, Harvard 
Law Review, vol. 95, no. 6, April 1982, pp. 1193-1322/ pp. 1232-1233: ”The reservation of a major 
share of economic life to a system structured through private litigation was a key element in the separation 
of powers scheme [...] The grant of extensive lawmaking authority to administrative bodies 
deprived the courts of much of their established dominion, granted vast responsibilities to 
bureaucratic entities not anticipated in the Constitution, and undermined the separation of 
powers” [emphasis supplied].  
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the state constituted in the logic of classical constitutionalism the barrier between 
private and public; its demise has to a certain extent led to the permeation of adju-
dication with the policy-making characteristics of administrative discretion. 
In his 1987 classic, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing1, Alexander Al-
einikoff noted that, for over forty years already, the post-New Deal birth and 
growth of the American welfare state and the blurring of the principled legal lines 
between public and private had led to an exponential proliferation of rights on the 
one hand and – on the other hand and correlatively – to the relativization and to an 
instrumentalist re-conceptualization of rights as social interests to be balanced 
against each other. Aleinikoff observed that this sort of interpretive judicial meth-
odology (balancing, Interessenabwägung) de-legitimates adjudication, since it hides 
an essentially political exercise under the thin veil of false pretenses of flexibility 
and objectivity. Rights cannot be rationally balanced in a judicial proceeding, since 
they lack a common denominator, a neutral point of reference against the back-
ground of which the balance could be struck. As Justice Antonin Scalia, a fervent 
opponent of the use of balancing techniques in American practice, noted with char-
acteristic wit and causticity: ”[T]he scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the 
interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a par-
ticular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy”2. 
The politicization of adjudication is fused at the hip with another contempo-
rary evolution, an abstract moralization of public law adjudication. Namely, the 
mirror image of judicial policy-making is the moralization and legalization of Poli-
tics which results from importing into public law and transposing tale quale in this 
field exactly the same considerations of justice and equity which characterize as a 
matter of course legal relations in the field of private law, with no heed being paid 
to the differences of context. Indeed, whereas classical public law had an ontologi-
cally tragic nature, the modern quest for rational answers in a legalized key to all 
problems and events partakes more of the melodramatic genre. From a melodra-
matic perspective, tragedy seems irrational, just like, in a legal paradigm, too much 
attachment to the most rational human decision-making form, namely adjudication, 
makes political solutions seem irrational. But then, as Lon Fuller pointed out, one 
should always bear in mind that: ”[The] higher responsibility toward rationality is 
at once the strength and the weakness of adjudication as a form of social ordering”3 
[emphasis in original]. Thus, the tragedy/melodrama difference I am describing 
relates to the burden of rationality which is placed by the judge on the execu-
tive/administrator in public law adjudication, i.e., the extent to which adjudica-
tion is limited in scope by the existence of spaces and fields of state action which 
cannot be legally, that is to say judicially, controlled and so have to be left to 
                                                    
1 T. Alexander ALEINIKOFF, ”Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,”, Yale Law Journal, 
vol. 96, no. 5, April 1987, pp. 943-1005.  
2 Bendix Autolite v. Midwesco Enterprises 486 U.S. 888 (1988), p. 897. The phenomenon of ba-
lancing, even though it is exemplified here through the intermediary of American developments, 
is not an American legal peculiarity but a common modern evolution. See, for an example of 
European ”balancing” of fundamental rights, Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria 19 Eur. Hum. Rts. 
Rep. 34 (1994), Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. The Otto-Preminger case shows 
just as well the problems with balacing as an unprincipled and essentially political adjucative 
exercise and the causes which led to the necessity for judicial balancing (legislative departure 
from established principles).  
3 Lon FULLER, ”The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”, Harvard Law Review, vol. 92, 
December 1978, pp. 353-409/p. 367. 
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political resolution. The tragic/melodramatic distinction in public law is drawn by 
the willingness or unwillingness of the judge to recognize the existence of spaces 
where state action under ambiguous (and thus discretionary) statutory provisions 
cannot be reduced to principled (reasoned) judicial resolution. 
The most fashionable contemporary justification of this sort of abstract moral-
ism, in the field of legal theory, is represented with rather monotonous prolixity by 
Ronald Dworkin, who maintains in essence that the judge can and must give a legal 
answer to any problem brought before him, no matter how insoluble at first sight. 
We have been wading so far through the obscurantist filth of insoluble dilemmas 
and quietistic distinctions, seeking to draw the limits of judicial rationality, oblivious 
to the fact that a rational solution as a matter of law can always be given. The answer 
is already in the law, embedded in the legal system. Consequently, the paradigmatic 
Dworkinian judge, called, in his high-flown rhetoric, ”Hercules”, only has to trot joy-
ously uphill towards it (in Dworkin’s less pedestrian formulation, ”by justificatory 
ascent”) in order to find a legal response to all questions under the sun. Hence the 
melodramatic connotations: Dworkin seems to confuse, albeit perhaps unwittingly, 
the rationality of law with the judicial rationalizations of given ideological predispo-
sitions. To wit, reason and common sense dictate (once we choose to listen) that a le-
gal answer cannot be given in ”limit situations” such as, for instance, the constitu-
tionality of same-sex marriage, euthanasia, abortion, when the answer has to be dis-
covered by divination from cryptic legal provisions, i.e., ”equal protection of the 
laws” and when this semantic legal vacuity cannot be complemented by a recourse 
to original purpose or the traditional application of the provision1. 
In terms of context, the problem of statutory vagueness, as the father of mod-
ern constitutionalism, John Locke, was keen to point out, may come not from the 
unwillingness of the judge to disciple the administrator and cut discretion down to 
size by interpretation of the law. The statutory mandate can perhaps be vague, 
conversely, due to the fact that the specific type of state activity is, analytically 
speaking, distinct and cannot be reduced to rules, because of its nature. 
A relevant example of melodramatic moralism in contemporary judicial prac-
tice is represented by a fairly recent Canadian administrative law decision review-
ing a denial of a deportation waiver request for ”humanitarian and compassionate 
reasons”. In Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)2, the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that legal errors (decisions involving interpretations of rules 
of law) and discretionary decisions could be reviewed in terms of substance on the 
same middle range between correctness and patent unreasonableness standard, 
one of reasonableness. It also held, procedure-wise, that the common law imposes 
on all public decision-makers a duty to give reasons3. Last but not least, much of 
                                                    
1 ”I foresee all manner of ’expert’ bodies, insulated from the political process, to which 
Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking responsibility. How tempting to create 
an expert Medical Commission (mostly M.D’s, with perhaps a few Ph.D.’s in moral philosophy) 
to dispose of such thorny, ’no-win’ political issues as the withholding of life-support systems in 
federally funded hospitals, or the use of fetal tissue for research.” J. Scalia, dissenting in Mistretta 
v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989) 
2 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.  
3 On this issue, more generally, see, David DYZENHAUS, Evan FOX-DECENT, ”Rethinking 
the Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v. Canada”, University of Toronto Law Journal, vol. 51, 
Summer 2001, pp. 193-242/p. 198. Baker is epitomatic for a wider trend in administrative law; see 
David DYZENHAUS, Murray HUNT, Michael TAGGART, ”The Principle of Legality in 
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the decisional outcome in the case was controlled by the ”interpretative incorpora-
tion” into the factors controlling the administrative process of the Convention of 
the Rights of the Child, ratified but un-incorporated into domestic law by Canada 
(and thus technically of no domestic legal effect whatsoever). 
More relevantly, with respect to the distinction between administrative error in 
interpretation of the law and discretionary decision-making, the Court opined that: 
”It is […] inaccurate to speak of a rigid dichotomy of ’discretionary’ or 
’non-discretionary’ decisions […] There is no easy distinction to be made be-
tween interpretation and the exercise of discretion; interpreting legal rules in-
volves considerable discretion to clarify, fill in legal gaps, and make choices 
among various options”. 
Nonetheless, pace widespread contemporary beliefs and tendencies, exercises 
in re-naming do not change the re-labeled referents; calling tomatoes and cucum-
bers by the same name does not make the two vegetables identical. In some ab-
stract and very trivial sense, it is true that interpreting legal rules and reviewing an 
exercise of discretion are not different. Yet, definitio fit per genus proximum et diffe-
rentia specifica. That sort of observation could only be made if adjudication were a 
semantic exercise proceeding against a background of academic aloofness and con-
textual void that cannot characterize judicial review. Judges who fail to take ac-
count of this difference delegitimize their office and open themselves to the charge 
that usually attains empty exercises of irresponsible moralism: hypocrisy1. It is evi-
dent that a certain grasp of reality and a minimal attempt at contextual discrimina-
tion still need to have some currency in public law adjudication if government is to 
go on. A prominent administrative law scholar, David Mullan, who hailed the 
Baker case as revolutionary, would later be nonplussed by a post September 9/11 
deportation in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)2, where the 
same test as that applied in Baker, the ”pragmatic and functional approach” re-
sulted in a very deferential decision. In terms of what has been said so far, it is 
clear that, to some extent, both the reveling and the dissatisfaction were triggered 
by the results as such within a sort of morally instrumental rather than a legal frame-
work of reference. Denying the essentially discretionary nature of such decisions 
does not make discretion disappear but rather changes the location of its exercise 
from the executive to the judiciary branch. Whether one wants the judge to be an 
unaccountable legislator and statesman is, taking the matter from there, a purely 
private preference. 
                                                    
Administrative Law: Internationalization as Constitutionalization,”, Oxford University Commonwealth 
Law Journal vol. 1, no. 1, June 2001, pp. 5-34.  
1 Thus, Edward Corwin famously characterized as an ”evident piece of arrant hypocrisy” 
Justice Davis’s sweeping declamations in the latter’s opinion for the Court in the Civil War case of 
Ex parte Milligan: ”The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in 
war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and 
under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever 
invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the 
great exigencies of government”. 71 U.S. 2 (4 Wall.), p. 121 (1866). See Edward S. CORWIN, The 
President-Office and Powers 1787-1957. History and Analysis of Practice and Opinion, New York 
University Press, New York, 1957, pp. 165-166.  
2 [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3. Note that in Suresh there was risk of torture attending deportation, so that 
important Charter values were also implicated in the decision.  
